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Cyber security has become an important issue both on the EU and the national 
level. Cyber security is now perceived as a part of national security. The newly 
emerging cyber security policy, comprising national cyber security strategies as 
an important constituent part, has been recently paid considerable attention. 
Speaking of national cyber security strategies, a positive thing is that the majority 
of EU member states have already approved such strategies. However, the 
approved strategies differ considerably in terms of their content and 
implementation. The present article aims at identifying reasons for differences in 
individual national strategies and analyses aspects of their unifications in 
expectation to find out an optimum balance between the degree of unification 
and the need to retain differences arising from intrinsic national singularities. To 
this end, the article analyses the issue of national cyber security on the basis of 
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practices for the development of cyber security strategies and by application of ENISA 
developed KPIs and testing ENISA cyber security strategy evaluation tool. Finally, the article 
suggests recommendations on further development of national cyber security strategies in 
terms of their unification and national singularities. 
Keywords: Cyber security; National cyber security strategy; Cyber security policy; 
Management 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 Cyber threats have become an issue of major concern both on the national and 
international level. Scientific research emphasizes the global nature of the cyber space 
predetermining the global character of the possible threats. Because of the global character, 
investigation in cyber incidents or attacks becomes complex and sometimes impossible. It has 
to be noted though that cyber-attacks actually take place in a particular territory and involve 
physical subjects located in a specific territory as well and are committed by natural or legal 
persons subject to particular national jurisdictions (SCHMITT, 2017). One may suggest to deal 
with the problem by coordinating cyber security policies on the global/regional level; however, 
the importance of national regulation in combating cyber threats may not be neglected as well. 
 Development of the cyber security policy has been paid considerable attention by the 
EU. In 2016, the EU adopted Directive (EU) 2016/1148 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 6 July 2016 concerning measures for a high common level of security of network 
and information systems across the Union, which became a major instrument helping unify 
cyber security policies of nation states. On 13 September 2017 the Commission adopted 
a cybersecurity package.  
 The Cybersecurity Act, which has now entered into force, lay at the core of the package. 
The changes this new EU regulation brings about are twofold: a comprehensive reform 
of ENISA and the creation of a certification framework (CYBER SECURITY. EUROPEAN 
COMMISSION). 
 An important role in the development of the cyber security policy is played by national 
cyber security strategies. The national strategies are actually one of the measures to ensure 
cyber security. Technologies and techniques, strategies and tactics, motives and ideologies, 
rules and laws, institutions and industries, power and money - all of these topics have a role to 
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 National cyber security strategies are becoming more and more important. Individual 
nation states invest significant efforts into development of their cyber security strategies. At 
the moment, approved national cyber security strategies may be found in all EU member states. 
The situation may be well illustrated by ENISA cyber security strategy interactive map, 
publicly available at (NATIONAL CYBER SECURITY STRATEGIES – INTERACTIVE 
MAP. ENISA). The map includes objectives set in individual national strategies. Already 
having looked at the objectives, one may spot differences in the numbers and the content. In 
the following chapters, the article describes an approach to national cyber security strategies as 
well as their unification and national singularities. 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW  
2.1. Endeavors to coordinate cyber security policies in combat against cyber attacks 
 Endeavours to combat cyber threats now being made on the EU level. In 2013, the EU 
adopted European cyber security strategy (AN OPEN, SAFE AND SECURE CYBERSPACE, 
2013). The strategy aims at making the EU digital environment the safest in the world and 
protecting major values and freedoms. It sets five major objectives: I) to improve cyber 
immunity, ii) to reduce the cybercrime rate, iii) to establish and further develop a cyber-defence 
policy, iv) to build up industrial and technological resources and v) to establish an international 
cyber space policy compliant with core values of the EU.  
 The European cyber security strategy was further extended by adopting several 
subsequent instruments:   
• The European Agenda on Security (THE EUROPEAN AGENDA ON SECURITY, 
2015) with the purpose to help judicial authorities and law enforcement agencies to 
respond to cybercrime, mainly by renewing policies and amending legal acts. The 
agenda also set goals to identify obstacles for criminal investigations and improve 
development of cyber capabilities.  
• A Digital Single Market Strategy for Europe (A CONTEST FOR EASTERN EUROPE, 
2015) with the purpose to create better opportunities to use digital products and services 
by means of creating proper conditions to exploit the potential of the digital economy 
growth. To this end, improvement of security, reliability and inclusion of the Internet 
is essential.  
• A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy 2016 with the 
purpose to strengthen the EU's role as a global actor. Cyber security has become a major 
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determination to deal with cyber issues in all spheres of politics, including tackling 
disinformation by means of strategic communication.  
 Issues of national cyber security strategies are out of the scope of the aforementioned 
instruments. However, it is important to note that the approach to cyber security and policy 
development should be wider to comprise national security aspects and other dimensions 
including disinformation and general threats. 
 One of the key binding instruments is Network and Information Security directive of 
2016, which laid down fundamentals for cyber security systems in all EU member states, 
ranging from standards of national cyber security strategies to the requirements for national 
CERTs. In fact, the directive harmonizes the content of national cyber security strategies.  
 First, the directive lays down a general obligation for member states to introduce 
national cyber security strategies. Second, the directive stipulates more explicit requirements 
in Article 7: The national strategy on the security of network and information systems primarily 
addresses the following issues: 
a) the objectives and priorities of the national strategy on the security of network and 
information systems; 
b) a governance framework to achieve the objectives and priorities of the national 
strategy on the security of network and information systems, including roles and 
responsibilities of the government bodies and the other relevant actors; 
c) the identification of measures relating to preparedness, response and recovery, 
including cooperation between the public and private sectors; 
d) an indication of the education, awareness-raising and training programmes relating to 
the national strategy on the security of network and information systems; 
e) an indication of the research and development plans relating to the national strategy 
on the security of network and information systems; 
f)  a risk assessment plan to identify risks; 
g) a list of the various actors involved in the implementation of the national strategy on 
the security of network and information systems. 
 Member States may turn to ENISA for advice and assistance when developing their 
national strategies. As per article 7(3) Member States ought to communicate their national 
strategies to the Commission within three months from their adoption (MARKOPOULOU; 
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 However, the directive is not likely to explicitly regulate obligations of nations states 
in terms of national cyber security strategies. In fact, the aforementioned obligations leave 
nation states considerable freedom in the development of their national cyber security 
strategies. Yet, according to the directive, at least key requirements laid down in Article 7 must 
be followed. 
 The directive had to be transposed into national law of EU members states by 2018. 
Most of the member states have already transposed the directive into their legislation (NIS 
IMPLEMENTATION TRACKER, 2020), mostly in 2018.  Although effective only for two 
years, the directive is already likely to yield positive results. It has to be noted though that the 
correlation between cyber incidents and the legal environment is difficult to evaluate, and it is 
not the object of this study to research the causal links. However, speaking of the latter, the 
statistics shows no decline in cyber risks (CYBERSECURITY STATISTICS FOR 2020).  
2.2. National cyber security strategies and their differences 
 So far, the creation and development of national cyber security strategies have been 
little coordinated. The strategies considerably differ in a range of aspects, including the key 
principles, goals, objectives and specific implementation measures. Some of them contain 
principles, goals and measures that are completely absent in strategies developed by other 
nation states. Descriptions of the strategies also differ: some of them are very explicit while 
others are much shorter, specifying in detail only, for example, the principles and objective.  
 Differences may also be observed in other aspects, such as the way of enforcement, 
legal status, termination, etc. Differences in national cyber security strategies have been 
evidenced by scientific study as well (ŠTITILIS; PAKUTINSKAS; MALINAUSKAITĖ, 
2016). Reasons of the observed differences vary. It may be the level of the state's maturity in 
the field (SABILLON et al., 2016) or it may be predetermined by different understanding of 
cyber security, specific national situations, etc. 
 At the moment, the process of adoption of the second or even the third strategy may be 
observed among various nation states. However, the newly adopted strategies still tend to retain 
considerable differences. Thus, as differences between provisions of individual national 
strategies remain, a uniform cyber security policy is still unlikely to emerge. Having in mind 
the fact that cyber threats are often of an international nature, the differences are likely to hinder 
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 Harmonization of national cyber security strategies may be insufficient as even on 
implementation of the directive provisions, individual strategies are likely to retain significant 
differences. 
 However, certain differences among national cyber security strategies may not be 
avoided as individual nation states may face specific cyber threats. Along with conventional 
cyber threats, today's security issues already include hybrid threats. For example, the Baltic 
states are constantly facing adverse propaganda disseminated by Russia. Propaganda may often 
be part of the so-called cyber war.  
 According to a recent study on hybrid threats, the Russkiy Mir Foundation (RMF) is a 
cultural and educational institution that promotes Russian language and culture across over 100 
countries. RMF has constructed a network of influencers among NATO nations, especially 
those bordering the Russian Federation. Such organisations are capable of activity which is 
hostile to the host nation and may contribute to cleavages in those societies (HYBRID 
THREATS: A STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS PRESPECTIVE, 2019). Thus, having in 
mind the wider context comprising national security aspects, such threats should also be 
described in national cyber security strategies along with relevant measures ensuring security 
of the cyber space. 
 Another example of specific threats may be observed in countries generating nuclear 
power, which have to deal with specific safety issues. Cyber threats are among possible threats 
in nuclear industry (NUCLEAR ENERGY AND CURRENT SECURITY ENVIRONMENT 
IN TH AREA OF HYBRID THREATS, 2019), to be considered on the national level. Certain 
electronically controlled nuclear power systems include safety control systems, which may be 
targeted by cyber attackers. Thus, issues of nuclear safety must be taken into consideration by 
planners of cyber security measures even on the national scale. 
 Differences may also be associated with the development and the state of the electronic 
communications infrastructure, singularities of legal regulation, etc. 
2.3. ENISA's role in harmonization of national cyber security strategies 
 ENISA’s work in supporting these strategies has focused on the analysis of existing 
NCSS; on the development and implementation of NCSS; on outlining and raising awareness 
of good practice to provide guidance and practical tools to the Member States for evaluating 
their NCSS (VENUTI TRANSLATION STRATEGY) To this end, ENISA provided 
recommendations or guidelines for good practices of the development of national cyber 
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terms of the provided recommendations/guidelines, took place in the period from 2012 to 2016. 
The list of ENISA activities is presented below. 
Table 1: ENISA recommendations/guidelines for national cyber security strategies  







This guide is updating the different steps, objectives and good practices of the 
original guide and analyses the status of NCSS in the European Union and 
EFTA area. The aim is to support EU Member States in their efforts to develop 
and update their NCSS. Therefore, the target audience of this guide are public 
officials and policy makers. The guide also provides useful insights for the 
stakeholders involved in the lifecycle of the strategy, such as private, civil and 
industry stakeholders (NCSS GOOD PRACTICE GUIDE). 
National Cyber 
Security strategies 
2012 The paper includes a short analysis of the current status of cyber security 
strategies within the European Union and elsewhere. It also identifies common 
themes and differences, and concludes with a series of observations and 
recommendations. The paper is based on the preliminary findings and analysis 
from an ENISA project that is working to develop a Good Practice Guide on 
how to develop, implement and maintain a national cyber security strategy 







2012 This report introduces a set of concrete actions, which if implemented will lead 
to a coherent and holistic national cyber-security strategy. It also proposes a 
national cyber-security strategy lifecycle, with a special emphasis on the 
development and execution phase. For each component of the strategy a list of 
possible and indicative Key performance indicators (KPIs) will be described. 
Senior policy makers will find practical recommendations on how to control the 
overall development and improvement process and how to follow up on the 
status of national cyber-security affairs within their country(NATIONAL 




2016 This guide is updating the different steps, objectives and good practices of the 
original guide and analyses the status of NCSS in the European Union and 
EFTA area. The aim is to support EU Member States in their efforts to develop 
and update their NCSS. Therefore, the target audience of this guide are public 
officials and policy makers. The guide also provides useful insights for the 
stakeholders involved in the lifecycle of the strategy, such as private, civil and 
industry stakeholders (NCSS GOOD PRACTICE GUIDE). 
Source: compiled by the authors 
 It can be stated that the aforementioned ENISA documents considerably contributed to 
formation of good practices in national cyber security strategies. However, as differences in 
national cyber security strategies show, unification of the strategies is still insufficient. It is 
very important for nation states to evaluate how specific strategies comply with ENISA formed 
good practices. Such evaluation may be done by means of a newly ENISA developed 
evaluation tool. 
 By 2018, ENISA created National Cyber Security Strategies evaluation tool to help 
Member States evaluate their strategic priorities and objectives related to National Cyber 
Security Strategies. The tool incorporated fifteen objectives, developed and presented in the 
aforementioned guidelines of 2016: 
• Develop national cyber contingency plans 
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• Organise cyber security exercises 
• Establish baseline security measures 
• Establish incident reporting mechanisms 
• Raise user awareness             
• Strengthen training and educational programmes 
• Establish an incident response capability 
• Address cyber crime 
• Engage in international cooperation 
• Establish a public-private partnership 
• Balance security with privacy 
• Institutionalise cooperation between public agencies 
• Foster R&D 
• Provide incentives for the private sector to invest in security measures. 
 The objective of this investigation - to assess EU cyber security policy and the 
potential for unifying national cyber security strategies. 
3. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 In preparing this article and presenting the outcomes of research, the authors used several 
methods, including analysis of legal regulation related to cyber security strategies and 
appropriate generalizations. The results of the comparative study of cyber security strategies 
were used, and the ENISA tool for evaluating cyber security strategies was analyzed. 
 The authors also used a modelling method. Based on the ENISA cyber security strategy 
evaluation tool, the situation was modelled in comparison with the Lithuanian cyber security 
strategy model.   
4. RESULTS 
4.1. National Cyber Security Strategies evaluation tool: example evaluation of 
Lithuanian national cyber security strategy 
 To illustrate how the evaluation tool actually works, we chose an example of Lithuania's 
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the Republic of Lithuania in 2018. Compared to equivalent cyber security strategies of other 
nation states (which often are just a set of cyber security principles), the strategy is actually an 
explicit and detailed document. The document is structured to include key objectives and goals 
which may be described as follows: 
 
 
Figure 1: Objectives and goals of the national cyber security strategy of Lithuania 
Source: compiled by the authors 
 As the objectives and goals are planned explicitly and in detail, the strategy may seem 
at the first sight to reflect of include all ENISA good practice objectives and implementation 
recommendations. Analysis of Lithuania's cyber security strategy may be good example to be 
followed by other countries. 
 The explicit evaluation of Lithuania's national cyber security strategy by means of the 
ENISA tool is given below. The ENISA evaluation tool was used to mark all the 15 objectives 
to be checked against criteria set in the ENISA model. 
 The results revealed that according to ENISA developed tool, Lithuania's national cyber 
security strategy still retains many places to be improved. The table below describes KPI`s (i.e. 





                                                 
1 However, it has to be noted that in case of a positive answer, the level of ENISA KPI implementation may 
differ. Thus, recommendations and the number of recommendations may as well be different. However, the table contains only 
general answers, which only reveal if a specific objective set by means of the ENISA tool was given recommendations 
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Table 2: Recommendations on specific objectives (present/absent) 
Objective Are recommendations given? Yes/No 
Develop national cyber contingency plans Yes 
Protect critical information infrastructure Yes 
Organise cyber security exercises Yes 
Establish baseline security measures Yes 
Establish incident reporting mechanisms Yes 
Raise user awareness Yes 
Strengthen training and educational programmes Yes 
Establish an incident response capability No 
Address cyber crime Yes 
Engage in international cooperation Yes 
Establish a public-private partnership Yes 
Balance security with privacy No 
Institutionalise cooperation between public agencies Yes 
Foster R&D Yes 
Provide incentives for the private sector to invest in security 
measures 
No 
 Source: compiled by the authors 
 Thus, only three areas of Lithuania's national cyber security strategy may be deemed 
fully compliant with ENISA good practice. Al the remaining areas were subject to certain 
recommendations on incompletely implemented ENISA suggested good practices. 
 The experiment with Lithuania's national cyber security strategy has revealed that 
despite being explicit and detailed, the strategy may still contain areas to be improved, 12 of 
15 objectives in this particular case. Although all the objectives may be found in Lithuania's 
national cyber security strategy, their specific description still needs to be improved and 
supplemented by additional measures. 
 However, it has to be noted that the ENISA evaluation tool sets identical KPIs and 
evaluation principles for all nation states. The method actually fails to evaluate if an individual 
nation state identifies certain singularities in their cyber security situation and if such 
singularities are considered in their cyber security strategies. One may doubt if such technique 
is the right way to evaluate individual cyber security strategies.  
 After all, nations states can be different in a variety of aspects, ranging from the size, 
population and financial capacities to introduce necessary safety measures to specific cyber 
threats predetermined by exterior factors, geographical location and cybercrime rate. How 
different the situation in the field of e-crime may be can be observed in Eurobarometer data 
published in 2019 (EUROPEANS’ ATTITUDES TOWARDS INTERNET SECURITY, 
2019). 





Licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 United States License 
 
2351 
INDEPENDENT JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT & PRODUCTION (IJM&P) 
http://www.ijmp.jor.br v. 11, n. 9, Special Edition (Baltic States), November 2020 
ISSN: 2236-269X 
DOI: 10.14807/ijmp.v11i9.1431 
 Prior to adoption of Lithuania's national cyber security strategy, a model of Lithuania's 
national cyber security strategy was developed (THE MODEL OF LITHUANIA'S 
NATIONAL CYBER SECURITY STRATEGY, 2017).  
 Among other questions, the model, designed specifically for an individual country 
(Lithuania in this particular case), emphasizes the necessity to take into account the national 
situation in Lithuania.  In other words, a national cyber security strategy must be developed in 
view of the specific national situation. In Lithuania's case, the following key elements may be 
distinguished:  
• cyber threats in Lithuania in terms of the geopolitical situation;  
• electronic public services and e-business in Lithuania;  
• legal environment, including national programs and strategies in the field of IT 
security and electronic data protection. 
 One of the specific things that can be mentioned in Lithuania's case is the that some of 
its critical infrastructure units are using SCADA information systems.  The systems contain 
certain elements prone to security risks, e.g. an opportunity to interfere with the security 
systems.  
 A good example may be the Stuxnet case where a computer worm has been used against 
Iran's nuclear program. Thus, the use of such systems, particularly in a critical infrastructure, 
incurs specific cyber security risks, which have to be taken into consideration when developing 
a national cyber security strategy. It is attributable to national singularities as SCADA systems 
are mostly used in Eastern European countries.  
 It has to be noted though, that the aforementioned elements identified in Lithuania's 
case may coincide with, be similar to or essentially differ from elements describing national 
singularities of other countries and may depend on political, economic and cultural factors.  
 In our opinion, it is essential for the developers of national cyber security strategies to 
take into consideration national singularities of individual nation states. The national 
singularities should also be included into ENISA KPIs and the ENISA evaluation tool. This 
would help nation states to develop adequate cyber security strategies suitable for their 
individual situations. 
 Further research might focus on the development of methodologies suitable for 
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to allow evaluation of the needs and development of cyber security systems actually responding 
to the real situation and real cyber threats.  
5. CONCLUSIONS 
 While issues of cyber security are quite explicitly coordinated on the EU level, 
regulation of national cyber security strategies is still minimal. National cyber security systems 
should undergo unification in view of the fact that cyber security threats often go beyond the 
boundaries of national borders and are, generally speaking, global, presenting essentially 
similar challenges to all nation states. 
 Legal regulation should be further developed on the EU level or on the level of 
recommendations so as to uniform national cyber security strategies, which have a significant 
impact both on the situation in the national cyber security and on safeguarding cyber security 
on the regional or international level. 
 However, unification of national cyber security strategies is still subject to certain 
restraints, that is they have to reflect inevitable national singularities. To put it other way, the 
strategies should also focus on national singularities identified by nation states alone. Although 
cyber threats are essentially of an international nature, national singularities, such as the 
geopolitical location, the developed electronic communications infrastructure, the national 
legal environment, etc., may have a significant role in ensuring cyber security and thus have to 
be reflected in the national cyber security strategy. 
 Good practices provided by ENISA for the development of national cyber security 
strategies have to put a greater emphasis on differences between individual strategies, 
predetermined by national singularities. Moreover, ENISA National Cyber Security Strategies 
evaluation tool should also comprise national singularities which may be important for cyber 
security situation in a particular country. Thus, the methodology of ENISA evaluation tool 
should also be improved. 
 Modern high quality national cyber security strategies capable of dealing with today’s 
cyber threats are only viable by additionally highlighting national singularities attributable to 
a cyber-security situation in a particular nation state. 
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